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OF GOVERNMENT FUNDING, RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS, AND NEUTRALITY: SEEING THE
CHARITABLE-CHOICE DEBATE THROUGH THE
LENS OF ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Christopher C. Lund*
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Locke v. Davey' was but another
step in the continuing debate over the role religious institutions will play in the
provision of government services. At the heart of that debate is "charitable
choice," a legislative program that began in 1996, which gave religious groups
equal access to federal funds for them to run religiously based social-service
programs. The Supreme Court's decision in Davey (like its earlier decision in
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris3) bears upon, but does not determine, how that debate
will be resolved.
The debate over charitable choice is, of course, part of a longstanding
disagreement over whether religious institutions should receive government funds
and, if so, to what extent. Variants of this question have been the subject of over
fifty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence from Everson v. Board of Education4
through Zelman and Davey. One side of the argument, usually denominated the
"separationist" side, has generally fought to limit government funding of religious
institutions; the other, often denominated the "neutralist" side, has generally
fought to expand it.5
* Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Houston Law Center. I would like to thank Kerry
Kornblatt, Leslie Griffin, Elisabeth Long, Lawrence Sager, and Douglas Laycock for their helpful
comments on this piece. I also would like to thank the editorial staff of the Tulsa Law Review for their
fine editing efforts and scheduling flexibility.
1. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
2. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (West
Supp. 2000)).
3. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
4. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
5. So acute are the disagreements between the two sides that even the labels used to describe them
are not widely agreed upon. Some would argue that the side denominated "separationist" is not
worthy of the label because they believe the position most consistent with separationism is a position
that includes religious institutions along with secular organizations in government-funding programs.
See Douglas Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory L.J. 43 (1997)
[hereinafter Laycock, Underlying Unity]. Similarly, one could point out that the "neutrality" label
might be misleading in the sense that many of those arguing for the funding of religious institutions are
clearly not neutralists; instead, they believe that religious institutions should be given priority to
government funds over nonreligious groups. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion:
1
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Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has relaxed the constraints of
the Establishment Clause and has begun permitting the governmental funding of
religious institutions. As Congress has begun to exercise its newfound authority,
another question has arisen. This is the question of regulation. While secular
private institutions providing government services are often regulated with a very
heavy hand, religious institutions have, both by statutory provisions and
constitutional norms, been exempt from much of that regulation. As the
government's utilization of religious institutions to deliver social services has
moved from constitutional impossibility to reality, the question of whether
religious institutions should keep their relatively unregulated status has been a
persistently contested question.
These regulatory questions are difficult in their own right. But what has
made the situation even more complex is the fact that these regulatory questions
have fed back into the funding question-the issue of how religious institutions
will be regulated now enters into the question of whether or not they should be
funded at all. The ancient, but simple, two-way disputes between neutralists and
separationists over funding are over. The modem charitable-choice debates
involve three sides, those who would support the funding of religious institutions
without regulation, those who would support the funding with regulation, and
those who would oppose funding altogether.
The fact that there are now three positions on charitable choice raises an
interesting thought. Several centuries ago, the mathematician Marquis de
Concorcet demonstrated the special problems that can arise when voters have
more than two options on any particular issue. Condorcet called this the Voter's
Paradox; Kenneth Arrow formalized it nearly fifty years ago as Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem. The shared insight underlying their work is that a group
of individuals can only be counted on to reach a stable consensus when it is given
pairwise choices; when a group has more than two alternatives to choose from, the
complexity of its collective preferences can send it into circles, unable to reach any
resolution at all. The democratic process, in these circumstances, essentially
breaks down.
The aim of this short symposium piece is to explain how the charitable-
choice debate is looking increasingly like a Voter's Paradox. This essay traces our
Voter's Paradox to its origin-our multifaceted, but inevitably contradictory,
notions of neutrality. And it follows the Paradox out to a number of possible
resolutions, including the rise of what Arrow would call "strategic voting" and
"agenda setting." Ultimately, this piece seeks both to further the debate on
charitable choice through the use of Arrow's conceptual apparatus, as well as to
provide Arrow's followers with a real-world sighting of the implications of his
work.
A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 876 (1986) (discussing and rejecting
such claims).
[Vol. 40:321
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I. THE DECISION IN LOCKE V. DAVEY AND CHARITABLE CHOICE
At issue in Davey was whether the State of Washington, having chosen to
create a broad scholarship program for low-income students attending college,
could constitutionally choose to exclude those students who would use the funds
to pursue a degree in devotional theology.6 This issue was, in one sense, the
conceptual flipside of the one the Supreme Court faced in Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris. In Zelman, the Supreme Court held that the inclusion of religious groups
in a voucher program did not violate the Establishment Clause] In Davey, the
issue was whether the exclusion of religious groups from a voucher program would
violate the Free Exercise Clause.' In other words, while Zelman posed the
question of whether the state could fund religious education, Davey asked
whether, having created a generally applicable funding program, the state had to
do so.
In an opinion that was quite terse, almost unanimous, and released
significantly before the end of the term, the Court held that Washington retained
the discretion to include or exclude theology students from its funding program.
Recognizing that Davey was faced with "neither criminal nor civil sanctions" 9
imposed on his religious exercise, and noting Washington's "historic and
substantial"'--rather than animus-based-reasons for excluding theology
students, the Court turned away Davey's claim."
Davey relates to charitable choice only tangentially. The Davey Court noted
that there was no dispute that Washington could have chosen to include religious
groups in its funding program, if it had so desired.12 By explicitly reaffirming this
principle, the Court again indicated its potential receptiveness to government-
funding programs that include religious providers along neutral criteria-such as
charitable choice. 3
6. 540 U.S. at 715.
7. 536 U.S. at 644.
8. 540 U.S. at 719.
9. Id. at 720.
10. ld. at 725.
11. For a comprehensive overview and systematic critique of the Court's reasoning, see Douglas
Laycock, Theology Scholarships, The Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the
Extremes But Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 155, 171-200 (2004).
12. Davey, 540 U.S. at 719 ("As such, there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the
Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology, and the State
does not contend otherwise."). One striking thing about the Davey opinion is that even the four
Zelman dissenters signed on to this statement. See The Pew Forum on Relig. & Pub. Life, Speech,
Anthony Picarello, Pres. & Gen. Counsel, Discussion: Locke v. Davey and Beyond, http://
pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=52 (Feb. 1, 2005).
13. See The Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty, Remark, Kevin J. Hasson, Pres., Supreme Court
Decision in Locke v. Davey Is Good News in Battle Against Blaine Amendments,
http://becketfund.org/index.php/article/249.html (Feb. 25, 2004) (noting that the passage quoted in note
12 "[c]learly... bodes well for religious groups participating in charitable choice programs").
Although Davey's language suggested, implicitly, that the Court would be receptive to
initiatives like charitable choice, the program at issue in Davey was the same sort of voucher program
as the one at issue in Zelman. For that reason, the Davey court did not have occasion to address
whether there is any constitutional difference between indirectly funded voucher programs and directly
funded programs (such as charitable choice). Whether this difference is or should be constitutionally
2004]
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Of course, if the Court had decided the case in Davey's favor, the
implication would have been that charitable choice's inclusion of religious
providers was not only constitutionally permissible, but perhaps actually
constitutionally required. During oral argument, the Court seemed quite
concerned that siding with Davey would commit the Court to the task of
integrating religious institutions into all sorts of government-benefit programs.
14
The far-reaching implications of such a decision may be the best explanation for
the Court's aloof reaction to Davey's claim.
II. THE FUNDING DEBATE AND THE ADVENT OF CHARITABLE CHOICE
At least since the Supreme Court's decision in Everson v. Board of
Education," there has been a perpetual clash between two strains of
Establishment Clause thought-a clash that is easily detectable within, but
certainly antecedent to, the charitable-choice debates. This clash is between those
who believe that religious organizations should be as entitled as secular
organizations to government funds spent on public purposes and those that do
not.16 Both these groups can trace their positions back at least to the Supreme
Court's decision in Everson. There, the Supreme Court faced the question of
whether to permit New Jersey to fund bus transportation for private school
students-a group that included students attending both secular and religious
schools. 7 Although the Supreme Court ultimately struck down the aid as a
violation of the Establishment Clause, it seemed to adopt the rationales of both
18
the no-aid and nondiscrimination positions in its opinion.
The conflict between these two visions of the Establishment Clause
continues to this day. While the no-aid position seemed dominant for decades, a
recent string of Supreme Court decisions has significantly, if not completely,
significant is a question that has been significantly debated and remains fiercely contested. See infra
nn. 20-21 (discussing the two positions on this issue).
14. During oral argument, Justice Breyer voiced these concerns to Solicitor General Olson, who
was supporting Davey as amicus curiae:
[Tihe implications of this case are breathtaking, that it would mean if your side wins, that
every program, not just educational programs, but nursing programs, hospital programs,
social welfare programs, contracting programs throughout the governments ... there'd be a
claim in each instance that they cannot be purely secular, that they must fund all religions
who want to do the same thing, and that those religions, by the way, though it may be an
excellent principle, may get into fights with each other about billions and billions of
dollars.... So, I'd like you to address that.
Oral Argument at 51-52, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
15. 330 U.S. 1.
16. Commentators have labeled the two sides of this debate in varying ways. See Carl E. Esbeck, A
Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46
Emory L.J. 1, 4 (1997) (using the labels of "separationism" and "neutrality"); Laycock, Underlying
Unity, supra n. 5, at 46-48 (using the labels of "no-aid" and "nondiscrimination theory"); David
Saperstein, Public Accountability and Faith-Based Organizations: A Problem Best Avoided, 116 Harv.
L. Rev. 1353, 1385 (2003) (using the labels of "functional" and "facial neutrality").
17. 330 U.S. at 15-16.
18. See Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra n. 5, at 53 ("[T]he essence of both the no-aid and the
nondiscrimination theories is succinctly laid out in two paragraphs of the Court's opinion in Everson.").
[Vol. 40:321
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undercut it in favor of a general nondiscrimination principle.' 9 Nevertheless, the
logical extensions of that principle have not been completely adopted by the
Supreme Court; the Court's decision in Davey, for example, suggests that the
nondiscrimination position is legislative prerogative rather than constitutional
command. Moreover, as separationists have argued, the Supreme Court has still
not approved the direct funding of religious institutions, even as part of a facially
neutral legislative program.20 While the distinction between direct and indirect
funding seems facile to some,2' there is still one strong constitutional arrow in the
quiver of those that oppose governmental funding of religious institutions.
One such direct-funding program-indeed, the most important direct-
funding program-is the program commonly known as "charitable choice."
Charitable choice began in 1996 with the passage of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.22 That act requires government
agencies to allow religious institutions to participate in funding opportunities on
an equal basis with nonreligious organizations. 23  Charitable-choice provisions
have spread and they now apply, as others have noted, to many federal programs,
including: Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Welfare-to-Work, Community
Services Block Grants, Substance Abuse and Treatment Block Grants, and
19. See e.g. Zelman, 536 U.S. 639; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rectors & Visitors of the U. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
20. As Professor David Saperstein forcefully argues:
With all of the changes from the Supreme Court in the church-state arena, there is one
central principle that must be kept in mind: the Supreme Court has never approved direct
government cash support for pervasively sectarian institutions. Indeed, in cases in which the
Supreme Court and other courts have upheld some type of government support for such
religious institutions, they have gone out of their way to distinguish it from exactly the kind
of direct government subsidies of houses of worship, religious ministries, and parochial
schools that charitable choice entails ....
Supra n. 16, at 1378. Saperstein's point is a strong one, but it perhaps ignores the fact that the Court's
incremental movements from strict separationism to neutrality have always come with reservations-
reservations that are often just ignored in later cases. Compare e.g. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding aid to religious schools, but stressing that aid that could be
diverted to religious purposes, which would include vouchers, would likely be unconstitutional), with
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 672 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (upholding aid to religious schools in the form of
vouchers).
21. "There are no good constitutional reasons why the neutrality principle the Supreme Court has
developed to deal with questions of indirect funding should not also be applied to questions of direct
funding. The distinction is one of form, not substance." Stephen V. Monsma, The "Pervasively
Sectarian" Standard in Theory and Practice, 13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 321, 338 (1999).
22. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161-63 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 604a (2000)).
23. Of course, even before 1996, faith-based organizations played an important role in the delivery
of social services. See generally Stephen V. Monsma, When Sacred and Secular Mix: Religious
Nonprofit Organizations and Public Money (Rowman & Littlefield 1996). Before that point, however,
religious institutions could not directly enter into partnerships with the federal government; they
instead had to create secular nonprofit corporations to do so. While that may seem like a minor
requirement, charitable choice allows religious organizations to apply for and receive government
funds while keeping their religiosity undiluted. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(b) (explaining that the current
setup permits "religious organizations to accept certificates, vouchers, or other forms of
disbursement ... on the same basis as any other nongovernmental provider without impairing the
religious character of such organizations").
5
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Projects for Assistance in Transition from Homelessness.24 There have been some
attempts to expand charitable choice far beyond these boundaries, but they
generally have not succeeded.25
Charitable choice remains quite controversial and debates surrounding its
wisdom and constitutionality remain-just as the fights over the indirect funding
of religious schools existed both before and after the Court's decision in Zelman.
Proponents and opponents argue over many things. They disagree as to whether
religious providers will be better or worse at providing services of secular value.
They disagree as to whether religious institutions themselves would be better
served by being denied or by refusing government funds. Perhaps most
importantly, they disagree on charitable choice's constitutionality. Proponents of
charitable choice argue that failing to fund religious groups violates the
Constitution's promise of equality. Opponents argue that funding religious groups
violates the Constitution's promise of a secular government. And some in the
middle, finding both of these constitutional arguments unpersuasive, see the issue
as one the Constitution does not decide.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF THE REGULATION QUESTION:
FROM TWO POSITIONS TO THREE
This debate-the debate over the funding of religious institutions-is one
that still rages, and the two positions associated with it remain diametrically
opposed to one another. But an interesting development has occurred. As
charitable choice has grown, the question of how religious institutions that receive
government funds will be regulated (which was formerly purely conjectural) now
has real importance.
The question of regulation arises because religious entities are endowed with
special rights to avoid regulation. Perhaps unlike secular groups, they have an
apparently constitutional right to choose their leaders.26  They also receive a
number of statutory exemptions-they need not even file applications for tax-
exempt status, cannot be brought into tort or contractual liability on issues of their
religious conduct, and receive a number of other statutory exemptions." The
24. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Government Relationships with Faith-Based Providers: The
State of the Law 4, http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/reports/10-23-2002 state-of-the
law.pdf (accessed Jan. 6, 2005). President Bush has further developed charitable choice through the
issuance of several executive orders. See Exec. Or. 13279, 3 C.F.R. 258 (2002); Exec. Or. 13199, 3
C.F.R. 752 (2001); Exec. Or. 13198, 3 C.F.R. 750 (2001).
25. For a comprehensive legislative history of subsequent bills intended to expand charitable
choice, see Robert W. Carter, Jr., Student Author, Faith-Based Initiatives: Expanding Government
Collaboration with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 27 Seton Hall Legis. J. 305 (2003).
26. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in Our
Constitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 72-74 (2002). One might question whether that constitutional
right remains particular to religious groups after the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), which seems to give a similar right to all organizations, regardless
of their religious or secular nature. See Mark Tushnet, The Redundant Free Exercise Clause?, 33 Loy.
U. Chi. L.J. 71, 85-91 (2001).
27. See Saperstein, supra n. 16, at 1387.
[Vol. 40:321
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statutes implementing charitable choice go to lengths to preserve these sorts of
21
exemptions.
The most important regulatory issue, however, is the issue of religious
discrimination. Religious groups are, by statute, exempt from some of the
nondiscrimination requirements imposed on secular corporations by Title VII.
While Title VII generally forbids employment discrimination on the basis of
religion, race, sex, and national origin, a special section of the Act lifts the ban on
29
religious discrimination for religious entities.
This exemption is largely seen as crucial by religious organizations.3° For
that reason, the question of whether religious organizations will be able to
preserve that exemption when government funding is involved has become a
crucial element in the charitable-choice debate.31 It is controversy over this issue
that seems to have prevented proponents from being able to expand charitable
choice to federal grant programs more generally.32 Some argue that the regulation
of religious providers of government services is a concern of the first order or even
constitutionally required.33  Alternatively, many believe that the regulation of
religious providers is unwise or even constitutionally forbidden.34
The introduction of questions of regulation has changed the tone of the
charitable-choice debate. The questions of funding and regulation-once
28. The charitable-choice provision explicitly protects the right of religious organizations to
maintain their form of internal governance, retain their independence from federal, state and local
governments, and to keep up religious iconography on their property. 42 U.S.C. § 604(d).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2000). The constitutionality of this exemption was upheld unanimously
in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987).
30. See e.g. Carl H. Esbeck, Stanley W. Carlson-Thies & Ronald J. Sider, The Freedom of Faith-
Based Organizations to Staff on a Religious Basis (Ctr. for Pub. Just. 2004); Paul Taylor, The Costs of
Denying Religious Organizations the Right to Staff on a Religious Basis When They Join Federal Social
Service Efforts, 12 Geo. Mason U. Civ. Rights L.J. 159 (2002). As will be discussed later, the right to
discriminate on the basis of religion is of such importance to religious organizations that even some
supporters of charitable choice would not back it without the right being maintained. See infra n. 73.
31. See Steven K. Green, Religious Discrimination, Public Finding, and Constitutional Values, 30
Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 7 (2003) ("The religious discrimination issue has risen to the forefront of the
Charitable Choice debate .... "); Elbert Lin, Jon D. Michaels, Rajesh Nayak, Katherine Tang
Newberger, Nikhil Shanbhag & Jake Sullivan, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political Future of
Federally-Funded Faith-Based Initiatives, 20 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 183, 224 (2002) ("[P]ublic
opposition to and political debate regarding faith-based initiatives may center on issues of
discrimination, as we believe it will in the legal realm.").
32. See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman's Future: Vouchers, Sectarian Providers, and the
Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 917, 993 n. 325 (2003) (explaining how
"battles over the scope of employment discrimination laws as applied to faith-based providers have
been a central impediment to current legislative proposals to expand charitable choice").
33. See infra nn. 41-42. The constitutional arguments can take two forms. The first argument is that
the receipt of government funds renders religious institutions governmental actors for constitutional
purposes, so that they are bound by the Constitution's prohibition on religious discrimination. The
second argument is that exempting religious, but not secular, organizations from Title VII's prohibition
on religious discrimination is an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. These arguments are
usually raised in tandem. See Alex J. Luchenitser, Casting Aside the Constitution: The Trend Toward
Government Funding of Religious Social Service Providers, 35 Clearinghouse Rev. 615, 617-27 (2002);
Laura B. Mutterperl, Student Author, Employment at (God's) Will: The Constitutionality of
Antidiscrimination Exemptions in Charitable Choice Legislation, 37 Harv. Civ. Rights-Civ. Libs. L.
Rev. 389, 426-43 (2002); Green, supra n. 31, at 44-55.
34. See infra n. 45.
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conceptually separate-have become conflated. The orderly, if not necessarily
civil, debate between separationists and neutralists has become something far
more complex, as there are now three positions that can be taken in the
charitable-choice debate. One can oppose funding altogether, one can support
funding but insist that religious groups give up their regulatory exemptions
(including, most prominently, the right to discriminate), or one can support
funding and allow religious groups to retain their deregulated status. Consider
these the no-funding position, the regulated-funding position, and the
deregulated-funding position, respectively.
For separationists, the introduction of the regulation question has not
influenced their position on funding. For them, the regulation question has
remained distinct from the funding question. They, therefore, have a relatively
easy time adjusting to the new situation.
But the same cannot be said for the neutrality camp. For them, the question
of regulation has fed back into the question of funding with dire consequences.
The specter of regulation has in many ways broken apart the easy conception of
neutrality that had earlier existed. For before the question of regulation arose,
every conception of neutrality pointed toward the equal funding of religious
institutions. Formal neutrality suggested that the government should treat
religious and secular organizations alike, and thus favored extending funds to
religious nonprofit organizations on the same terms as secular nonprofit
organizations.35 Substantive neutrality reinforced that conclusion by stressing that
denying religious organizations funding would pressure them to secularize.36
There were arguments that the funding of religious institutions generally violated
neutrality principles. 37  But those arguments did not seem to have widespread
35. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 96
(1961) (framing the notion of formal neutrality as the requirement "that government cannot utilize
religion as a standard for action or inaction because [the Constitution] prohibit[s] classification in terms
of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden").
36. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001 (1990) (defining substantive neutrality as requiring "government to minimize
the extent to which it either encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or
nonpractice, observance or nonobservance").
37. Professor Brownstein endorsed this view, stressing that charitable choice is not neutral in that
the vast amount of government funds will inure to the benefit of dominant, rather than minority,
religious groups. See e.g. Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty,
Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis of "Neutrality Theory" and Charitable Choice,
13 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 243, 246-56 (1999). See also Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny
Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable Choice, 5 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 149, 198 (2000)
(making a similar argument). Brownstein also made a more nuanced neutrality argument when he
explained how charitable choice, as a program that was formally neutral, might not be substantively
neutral. A Jewish social-service program religiously obligated to close on Saturday, faced with the loss
of government funds for doing so, might choose to depart from its religious commitments for
government funds. Brownstein, supra, at 251. Such covert government influence over religious choices
would be a classic violation of substantive neutrality.
Brownstein's example reflects an important concern. But the conclusion he draws seems
incorrect. If we are concerned primarily about pressure being placed on the Jewish organization to
change its religious commitments, it would be best to have constraints on the government's ability to
attach these sorts of operating conditions. Brownstein's solution-preventing religious organizations
from receiving funding-only changes the form of the pressure. For instead of being pressured to
abandon its commitments to the Sabbath by the lure of government funds, the Jewish group now will
[Vol. 40:321
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influence and were soundly rejected by the conception of neutrality the Supreme
Court adopted in Zelman.35
But the introduction of the regulation question has destroyed the consensus
on what neutrality requires. Consider the following religious neutrality concerns:
Neutrality Concern A: "Neutrality" requires that religious groups be
39funded on the same basis as secular groups.
Neutrality Concern B: "Neutrality" requires that religious groups have
the ability to resist regulation in order to
maintain their identity, most importantly by
maintaining the right to discriminate among
employees on the basis of religion.40
Neutrality Concern C: "Neutrality" requires that employees of
government-funded jobs not face discrimination
because of their religious beliefs.
41
be pressured to make even larger changes (i.e., to completely secularize its program). Perhaps
religious organizations will feel more pressure to change for government monies when the requested
change is minor rather than comprehensive. But, in any event, a better solution suggests itself-having
the government take special precautions to insure that minority religious organizations receiving
government funds can still maintain their diverse religious commitments.
38. The Zelman court, by rejecting the conclusion that a voucher program was unconstitutional
simply because the vast majority of the funds ended up going to religious private schools, seems to
have dispatched this neutrality argument-or at least stripped it of its constitutional status. 536 U.S. at
651-53.
39. See e.g. Laycock, Underlying Unity, supra n. 5, at 48 (explaining that "any discrimination against
religion is a departure from neutrality" and that neutrality demands that "a government that pays for
medical care should pay equally whether the care is provided in a religious or a secular hospital");
Esbeck, supra n. 16, at 20-21 ("Neutrality theory [requires that] when government provides benefits to
enable activities that serve the public good, such as education, health care, or social services, there
should be [no] discrimination in eligibility based on religion.").
40. See e.g. Charles L. Glenn, The Ambiguous Embrace: Government and Faith-Based Schools and
Social Agencies 101 (Princeton U. Press 2000) (arguing that neutrality requires not only "that faith-
based organizations be eligible for funding" but also that they be "protected from interference with
how they approach the work for which they are funded"); Stephen V. Monsma, Positive Neutrality:
Letting Religious Freedom Ring 188-209 (Greenwood Press 1993) (arguing that neutrality,
conceptualized as "positive neutrality," requires that religious organizations remain generally free from
the regulations imposed on secular organizations); Esbeck, supra n. 16, at 26 (arguing that "exemptions
from regulatory burdens" for religious institutions is the only way to be "neutral" with respect to the
"impact of governmental action on personal religious choices").
41. See Green, supra n. 33, at 50 ("Few results could be further from the principle of neutrality that
prohibits government from affecting the religious choices of individuals" than "[a]llowing religious
organizations to discriminate in publicly funded positions."); Mutterperl, supra n. 31, at 437 (explaining
that allowing religious discrimination within religious institutions "is not neutral" because it both
"favors the selected organization's coreligionists" and deprives non-coreligionists "of the ability to
compete equally for federally funded jobs").
2004]
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Neutrality Concern D: "Neutrality" requires that the government
regulate the use of its funds in the same manner
regardless of whether the receiving institution is
religious or secular.42
All four of these neutrality concerns are logically derivative from principles
of formal and substantive neutrality. 43 Each of them also has some constitutional
pedigree. Concern A had been pushed for years as a constitutional requirement
of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses." Although courts have not
addressed the issue, commentators have suggested that the Free Exercise Clause
or the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine may require Concern B as a special
protection for religious groups participating in governmental programs.45 Concern
C has now, in several articles, been forcefully pushed as a requirement of either
42. See Steven K. Green, The Ambiguity of Neutrality, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 692, 711 (2001) (arguing
that neutrality not only does not justify "protecting the religious identity of religious providers and
exempting them from Title VII," but also requires that religious organizations be subject to "laws of
general applicability, even if their application has a disproportionate impact on religious practice");
Mutterperl, supra n. 33, at 432, 434 (arguing that neutrality "fails to sustain the constitutionality of [any
regulatory] exemption" because the "financial subsidies in charitable choice transform the relationship
between the government and private entity" so that "[alny accommodation [from regulatory
requirements] granted to religious entities and denied to secular entities constitutes establishment").
43. There are other possible neutrality considerations. One is the concern that beneficiaries of
charitable-choice programs will not be able to find a secular provider and will be effectively coerced
into participating in religious programs with which they disagree. This neutrality concern, however, is
widely recognized and accepted by all parties in the charitable-choice debate. See H.R. Subcomm. On
the Const. of the Jud. Comm., Hearing on the Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations in
Competitions for Federal Social Service Funds, 107th Cong. 71 (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter Hearing on
the Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations] (statement of Ira C. Lupu, L. Prof., Geo. Wash.
Sch. of L.) ("Proponents and opponents of [charitable-choice] legislation concur that beneficiaries
should never be forced to accept religiously influenced social services, or be forced to accept any such
services in a religious setting.").
Federal law accordingly forbids religious organizations from conditioning services upon a
beneficiary's religious participation and guarantees beneficiaries the right to receive services from an
alternative, secular provider. See 42 U.S.C. § 604a(e)(1), (g). Whether this statute will protect
beneficiaries in practice may be a separate question. Hearing on the Constitutional Role of Faith-Based
Organizations, supra, at 50-51 (statement of Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in
L., U. Tx. Sch. of L.) (articulating concerns as to whether these sorts of safeguards will, in practice, be
meaningful).
44. See supra n. 39 (giving constitutional arguments in favor of this neutrality concern). This
concern was adopted as a requirement of the Free Speech Clause in Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, which
incorporated that notion of neutrality into the concept of viewpoint discrimination. But the Supreme
Court's decision in Davey makes clear that it is not a general command of the Free Exercise Clause.
See supra nn. 5-14 and accompanying text.
45. See Hearing on the Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations, supra n. 43, at 88
(testimony of Douglas Laycock, Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in L., U. Tx. Sch. of L.) ("I think
if we had a court that cared about free exercise, that would be an unconstitutional condition. The
government should not say to religious organizations, if you get rid of enough of that religious stuff we
will give you some money."); Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New
Constitutional Questions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 218-19 (2003) (noting that "the Constitution still
guarantees some special freedoms for religious institutions even after Employment Division v. Smith,
including the right to hire and fire clergy [funded by government programs] and the broader right of
church autonomy"). But see Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 32, at 976 (arguing that a church's autonomy
concerns will diminish significantly when a government entity is funding the program at issue); Marc D.
Stem, School Vouchers-The Church-State Debate That Really Isn't, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 977, 991 (1999)
(suggesting, at least in the school voucher context, that it is "unlikely that [such antidiscrimination
strings] could be challenged as an unconstitutional condition on the grant of government funds").
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the Establishment or Equal Protection Clause, although few court cases address
it.46  Concern D was perhaps forcefully rejected by the Supreme Court in
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,47 but that rejection was made
without consideration of issues of government funding. Those supporting
Concern D as a constitutional matter suggest that, in the context of charitable
choice, the Constitution requires a different outcome.
48
This creates a problem for the committed neutralist, for the four neutrality
concerns above are irreconcilable with each other. It is simply not possible to
create a position on the funding and regulation questions that can satisfy all four.
Each position is consistent with some, but only some, of them:
Position 1: The No-Funding Position
This position is consistent with concerns B, C, and D.
Position 2: The Deregulated-Funding Position
This position is consistent with concerns A and B.
Position 3: The Regulated-Funding Position
This position is consistent with concerns A, C, and D.
Note that no position has a set of neutrality concerns that completely
contains another position's set of neutrality concerns. To put the point more
strongly, any argument that any of these three positions is any "more neutral"
than another must be based on some prior commitment to the value of some
neutrality concerns over others. Without such a commitment, it cannot be said
that any one position is more neutral than any other. This, of course, is somewhat
dismaying. Neutrality here pushes toward no less than three ideas of the role
religious institutions should play in our society. Commentators have often seen
neutrality as a word that is ultimately meaningless. Although this claim can often
be overstated, it is impossible to deny its force here.49
46. See supra n. 41 (giving constitutional arguments in favor of this neutrality concern).
47. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
48. See supra n. 42 (giving constitutional arguments in favor of this neutrality concern).
49. Despite the fact that neutrality does push in many directions, some commentators perhaps go
too far in suggesting it has no conceptual value. Professor Frank Ravitch, for example, recently
remarked, "Like the tooth fairy, neutrality is just a myth, but like children who want the tooth fairy to
visit, we want neutrality to be real or at least for something to stand in for it to make us believe it is
real." A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to Neutrality: Broad Principles, Formalism, and the
Establishment Clause, 38 Ga. L. Rev. 489, 504 (2004). See generally Steven D. Smith, Foreordained
Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of Religious Freedom (Oxford U. Press 1995) (arguing
that neutrality is an essentially illusory concept).
It is no doubt true that neutrality is often used opportunistically, and might have (as we have
seen) seemingly contradictory dictates in any particular situation. Yet it seems strange to conclude that
neutrality has no meaning by means of an argument that suggests that neutrality has too many
meanings. Douglas Laycock makes essentially the same point regarding the phrase "separation of
church and state" in his review of Philip Hamburger's important book of the same title. See Douglas
Laycock, The Many Meanings of Separation, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1667 (2003).
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One other point should be made. Earlier, we noted that before the question
of regulation entered the picture, conceptions of neutrality-every conception of
neutrality-lay in support of the funding of religious institutions. But now one
can reach the no-funding position purely out of respect for neutrality principles; a
firm commitment against government-funded religious discrimination and a deep
fear of religious institutions being regulated and losing their rights to preserve
their identity reaches that result.5°
IV. THE VOTER'S PARADOX, ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM,
AND THE CHARITABLE-CHOICE DEBATE
The introduction of the regulation question, as we have seen, has radically
changed the charitable-choice debate. The debate cannot now be reduced to a
string of pairwise questions regarding funding and regulation. The debate does
not now proceed by asking, "Should religious groups be funded? If so, how
should they be regulated?" Instead, the questions of funding and regulation have
been conflated into a single question that produces three possible answers. Each
of these answers has such disparate strengths and weakness that is impossible to
arrange them all on some easy linear continuum. For that reason, the Voter's
Paradox-and its more formalized cousin Arrow's Impossibility Theorem-
applies directly to this situation. For when three or more political choices that
cannot easily be arranged on a one-dimensional continuum exist, Arrow's
Impossibility Theorem explains that a failure of pure representative democracy
can occur. As is explained below, this is apparently what is currently happening in
the charitable-choice debate.
A. A Brief Introduction to the Voter's Paradox and Arrow's Impossibility
Theorem
The Voter's Paradox was developed by the Enlightenment mathematician
Marquis de Condorcet-although its implications were not fully realized until the
Paradox was rediscovered and refined by Kenneth Arrow." At the heart of the
Voter's Paradox is the insight that, in a system where voters are called upon to
rank three or more options, majority decisionmaking can fail to yield a coherent
result. A simple example of the Paradox's application illustrates its
counterintuitive implications best. Assume that there are three voters (Voters 1,
2, and 3) in an election precinct and three candidates (Candidates A, B, and C)
running for election. The ballot asks the voters to rank the candidates in order of
their preferences. The result of the election comes back as follows:
50. For a good example of a commentator apparently reaching this position principally through
consideration of neutrality principles, see Saperstein, supra n. 16.
51. Although Condorcet played the major role in developing the Voter's Paradox, he perhaps
would not have agreed with the uses to which later theorists have put his Paradox. See Cheryl D.
Block, Truth and Probability-Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 975,
982-83 (1998) (observing that although "[o]ne might think ... Condorcet himself would have been
critical of democratic voting procedures .... Condorcet actually became a more ardent believer in
democratic decision making in later writings").
[Vol. 40:321
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Ranking #1 Ranking #2 Ranking #3
Voter 1: A B C
Voter 2: B C A
Voter 3: C A B
In this example, a majority of the voters, Voters 1 and 3, prefer A to B. A
majority of the voters, Voters 1 and 2, prefer B to C. One would naturally think
then that a majority of voters would surely prefer A to C. But this turns out not to
be the case, as a majority of voters, Voters 2 and 3, actually prefer C to A. The
crushing impact of the Voter's Paradox is this: No matter how this election is
resolved, two-thirds of the voters in the district would have preferred some other
candidate to the one actually elected. If, by hook or crook, some candidate were
to be selected, there would be an immediate push for a recall election. In theory
at least, the recall process would continue with no end, because for every
candidate, there is another candidate that a majority of voters would rather have
in office. The Voter's Paradox thus illustrates the problems that exist when voters
are able to choose between more than two options that cannot be arranged on an
easy linear continuum.52 In such a situation, a democratic system may not be able
to lead to a stable or "rational" outcome.53 Without some radical change either in
how the elections are conducted or how voters conduct themselves at the polls, the
democratic process would cycle endlessly.
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is essentially a formalization of that last
sentence. Arrow discussed five basic conditions reflecting our common
perceptions of how elections should be conducted and how voters should behave
in a democratic system.5 4  These conditions were rationality,"
5  unanimity,5 6
52. It is important to note that the Paradox above develops not merely because voters adopt each of
the three positions as their first-place choices, but because their preferences are what we would call
"multi-peaked." One article explains:
Preferences are single-peaked when all alternatives can be arrayed in a single dimension,
such that each member's preference decreases in step with the distance of any alternative
from her optimum. This may occur if voters identify an issue as located on a single
ideological spectrum from Left to Right, and rank alternatives in direct proportion to their
distance from the ideological point with which they identify.
Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory,
Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 2121, 2135 n. 45. See also Block, supra n.
51, at 991 ("[D]espite the voting paradox, when individual preferences can be plotted along a single
dimensional scale, majority rule does result in consistent and stable group choices." (emphasis
omitted)).
This point will be made in more detail later, but it is precisely our multifarious notions of
neutrality-and the fact that they cannot be aligned along a single dimension-that has caused
preferences in the charitable-choice debate to be multi-peaked.
53. Arrow initially used the term "rationality" as a synonym for the requirement of transitivity.
Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values 21 (2d ed., John Wiley & Sons 1963)
(explaining "rationality" as the ability to maintain "a one-dimensional ordering of all possible
alternatives"). Other terms, like "consistency," are also used to refer to this criterion. See Pildes &
Anderson, supra n. 52, at 2131 n. 33.
54. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. Political
Econ. 328 (1950); Arrow, supra n. 53.
55. The criterion of rationality holds that if society prefers outcome A over outcome B and
outcome B over outcome C, it should also prefer outcome A over outcome C. In defining the criterion
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nondictatorship, 7 range, 5 8 and the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 9
Arrow then demonstrated that these five conditions were ultimately irreconcilable
with each other: to adopt four inherently means that a society has to reject the
fifth. Another equivalent way to state Arrow's conclusion is this: In a voting
regime where the last four criteria are satisfied, there can be instances of cycling
(i.e., failures to reach a "rational" outcome).60 A voting system can ensure
avoidance of cycling only by using a decisionmaking process that violates another
of the conditions.
Commentators dramatically disagree on the implications Arrow's Theorem
has for democratic decisionmaking. Some commentators go so far as to argue that
the Theorem exposes democratic decisionmaking as wholly arbitrary.6' Others
would go less far and just say that Arrow's Theorem poses a serious difficulty for
democracy.62 Some are even less concerned.63 But commentators of all political
stripes have found use for Arrow's principle, using it to justify everything from
broad delegations of legislative power to administrative agencies to the conclusion
that a two-party political system is preferable to a multiple-party one.64  And
certainly no one disputes its almost icon-like status.65
of rationality and Arrow's other criteria, this article largely borrows from language used by Herbert
Hovenkamp in his article, Arrow's Theorem: Ordinalism and Republican Government, 75 Iowa L. Rev.
949 (1990).
56. The unanimity requirement holds that "[i]f one person prefers outcome A over outcome B and
all other people either agree with that person or are absolutely indifferent between A and B, then
society prefers outcome A over outcome B." Id. at 950.
57. The nondictatorship axiom requires that no one individual have a position "such that if he
prefers outcome A over outcome B, outcome A will be chosen, no matter what the preferences of
others." Id.
58. The requirement of range imagines a process that considers "all relevant individual preferences,
and not just some arbitrarily defined subset. For example, if possible choices include outcome A,
outcome B, and outcome C, the process may not arbitrarily drop outcome C and force a decision
between outcome A and outcome B." Id.
59. Finally, this criterion (the independence of irrelevant alternatives) requires that "[w]ith respect
to any vote currently on the agenda-for example, as between outcome A and outcome B-how
voters would rank a different outcome-for example, C-must be totally irrelevant to the particular
vote at hand." Id.
60. Professor Hovenkamp notes the tendency of commentators to simply take the first four
conditions as axioms, and just treat Arrow's Theorem as guaranteeing the possibility of cycling under
those circumstances. See supra n. 55, at 951 ("Much of the literature relying on Arrow's theorem to
critique the legislative process argues that the transitivity condition will fail-that is, there will be an
endless cycle of votes and no natural end to the process."). In this way, Arrow's Theorem is effectively
reduced to a complicated form of the Voter's Paradox. But Hovenkamp rightly points out a more
obscure point about Arrow's Theorem, which is the cost that must be paid to prevent cycling-namely,
the failure of one of the four other conditions. Id. at 951-52.
61. See William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of
Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice 238 (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1982) ("The social
amalgamations of individual values are, for reasons just summarized, often inadequate-indeed
meaningless-interpretations of public opinion.... Clearly populism cannot survive.").
62. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 533, 547-48 (1983) ("Although
legislators have individual lists of desires, priorities, and preferences, it turns out to be difficult,
sometimes impossible, to aggregate these lists into a coherent collective choice.").
63. See Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at 949 ("[L]egislative outcomes [still] can be said to reflect the
welfare needs of constituents in a meaningful, although certainly not perfect, sense.").
64. See Pildes & Anderson, supra n. 52, at 2124-26.
65. Id. at 2124 (noting that the Theorem has been called "one of the most significant intellectual
achievements of this century").
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The more radical implications of Arrow's Theorem have often been avoided
through assumptions that these sorts of situations rarely arise in the real world.
Many of the examples used to explain the theorem are admittedly contrived or
phrased in an exceedingly high level of generality. 66 Finding an actual example of
these paradoxes in real life has been extraordinarily difficult.67 One commentator
has suggested that the Voter's Paradox is a modern day Loch Ness Monster.68
Arrow's Theorem therefore has remained largely more theoretical than real, as
there are very few, if any, examples of it actually occurring.
B. The Application of These Paradoxes to Charitable Choice
While the examples usually invoked to explain the Voter's Paradox and
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem are often abstract or wholly conjectural, the two
principles can be applied to the debate surrounding charitable choice in a
straightforward manner.
We have established that there exist communities that support each of the
three possible positions on charitable choice. There are advocates, usually the
original supporters of charitable choice, who adopt the deregulated-funding
position. 69 There are also the traditional detractors of charitable choice who adopt
the no-funding position.70 Finally, there is a burgeoning group of commentators-
66. See e.g. Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at 951-52 (giving the example of a hypothetical legislature that
can fund one of only three possible options-crop subsidies, welfare payments, and national defense).
In addition to this article, there are at least two other uses of religion-clause scenarios raising Voter's
Paradox issues; both are mostly conjectural. In their work, Richard Pildes and Elizabeth Anderson
invoke a situation where a town splits on whether to allow only creche displays, allow displays of
cr ches and other religious and secular symbols, or forbid all displays. Supra n. 50, at 2163-64. Judge,
then Professor, Easterbrook, once described a similar situation where three justices were committed to
a rigorous separationism, while three justices were committed to neutrality theory, and three others
were committed to balancing. Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 815-16 (1982).
67. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 Va. L. Rev.
423, 430 n. 25 (1988) (citing an unpublished study suggesting that, from 1919 to 1984, roll call voting in
the United States Congress has exhibited single-peakedness on a one-dimensional political spectrum);
Pildes & Anderson, supra n. 52, at 2140-41 (suggesting that "[tlhe distribution of citizen or
representative preferences over policies is usually not divergent enough-and thus social conflict is not
complex enough-to produce inconsistent collective preferences").
Another piece reviewing the literature put it the following way:
[Ilt is important to distinguish the theoretical analysis of when cycles can occur from the
practical analysis of when cycles do occur. The latter type of research is difficult because
information about the actual distribution. Unfortunately, even the largely theoretical
literature with regard to the frequency of cycling is inconclusive.
Block, supra n. 51, at 989-90 (emphasis and footnotes omitted).
68. Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics: Perspectives of a
"Reasonable Choice" Modeler, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 1541, 1553 (1993) ("Indeed, hunting for the [Voter's]
paradox is much like hunting for the Loch Ness monster: appearances are few and far between, and
some of the sightings are suspect.").
69. These proponents would include commentators like Carl Esbeck and Douglas Laycock. See
supra n. 39-40. It would also include the Coalition to Preserve Religious Freedom, a coalition of faith-
based organizations that includes such groups as World Vision, the Christian Legal Society and the
Center for Public Justice. See e.g. Council for Christian Colleges & Universities, Coalition to Preserve
Religious Freedom, http://www.cccu.org/services/services-detail.asp?servicelD=76&parentCatID=7
(accessed Jan. 6, 2005).
70. This would include academic theorists like Alan Brownstein, Steven Green, and David
Saperstein. See supra nn. 16, 37, 41-42. It would also include such diverse groups as Americans United
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often somewhat ignored-that have come to adopt the regulated-funding
position."
But, as explained before, the problem is not merely that three groups have
adopted varying positions with regard to charitable choice-the problem is that
their preferences are multi-peaked.72 Consider the following. Douglas Laycock
prefers that religious groups be funded equally to secular groups, but insists that
religious groups be deregulated. If such deregulation were impossible, he would
prefer that funding not occur at all.73 Steven Green believes that religious groups
should not be funded, but believes that if they are funded, they must be
regulated.74 Lastly, Martha Minow would ideally fund religious groups, but would
prefer that they be regulated. 75 Labels aside, the confluence of the preferences of
for Separation of Church and State, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, and the Baptist Joint
Committee-as well as the member groups of the Coalition Against Religious Discrimination. See
Am. Humanist Assoc., The Coalition Against Religious Discrimination, Letter to President George W.
Bush, http://www.americanhumanist.org/press/CoalAgRelDis.htm (accessed Jan. 6, 2005) [hereinafter
Coalition Against Religious Discrimination Letter].
71. Perhaps the most influential article taking this position is Martha Minow's piece, Public and
Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 1229 (2003). There are
apparently other advocates of this view as well. See e.g. Michele Estrin Gilman, "Charitable Choice"
and the Accountability Challenge: Reconciling the Need for Regulation with the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 799 (2002).
72. See supra n. 52 (describing the requirement of multi-peakedness as a condition necessary for the
Voter's Paradox to develop). It is important to stress that the breakdown of neutrality, described in
Parts II and III of this paper, serves to explain the multi-peakedness of preferences in charitable
choice. The many meanings of neutrality, which cannot be arranged on any one-dimensional
continuum, have contributed to this problem.
73. In testimony given in support of charitable choice, Laycock argued that deregulation was an
absolutely vital part of any charitable-choice program. He made it clear that he would prefer not to
fund religious entities at all than fund them in a regulated manner:
Let me say just a little bit about this controversy over hiring. It is an essential part of
deregulating the religious providers to the extent that very few of them refuse to hire any
Member not of their own church, but many of them prefer Members of their own church-
grant a preference. It is a serious intrusion into religious liberty to take that away.
It would be better to vote down charitable choice than to remove the deregulation of
religious providers. From a religious liberty perspective, the worst outcome would be to
codify a rule that government offers money to religious providers but only on condition that
they agree to secularize themselves.
Hearing on the Constitutional Role of Faith-Based Organizations, supra n. 43, at 37, 49 (statement of
Douglas Laycock).
74. Professor Green, a former legal director of Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, lays out these points in his piece, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. Annual
Survey Am. L. 33 (2000). He there argues that charitable choice is unconstitutional principally because
government "[f]unding an activity with the express purpose and goal of inculcating religious values and
beliefs violates the core of the Establishment Clause prohibition." Id. at 47. Alternatively, however,
he argues that allowing religious entities special rights to resist regulation-including the right to
discriminate on the basis of religion-would also be unconstitutional. Providing "distinct advantages
to religious entities that non-religious entities do not share," Green argues, "violates the Establishment
Clause in a more subtle way." Id. at 44, 47.
75. Minow, in general, is a supporter of public-religious partnerships. Her article makes it clear,
however, that she believes that religious organizations operating with government funds should be held
accountable by the government for the use of those funds. She believes that, "like the state itself,"
religious entities that receive funds should "refrain from violating state and local antidiscrimination
employment law and strive to ensure participants' freedom of religion and expression." Supra n. 71, at
1261.
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these voters creates a table identical to the one initially demonstrating the Voter's
Paradox:
Ranking #1 Ranking #2 Ranking #3
Voter 1 (Laycock): A B C
Voter 2 (Green): B C A
Voter 3 (Minow): C A B
A represents the deregulated-funding position.
B represents the no-funding position.
C represents the regulated-funding position.
As one can see, the votes here cycle in the same basic way as they did when
the Voter's Paradox was first considered. Assuming the no-funding position as
the status quo, Laycock and Minow-who both generally believe that religious
groups should receive funding-would choose to fund religious providers and
move to the deregulated-funding position. With that decision made, however,
Minow and Green would recognize their common interest in ensuring the
accountability of religious providers and would move to the regulated-funding
position. At that point, Laycock's support for charitable choice would collapse
and he and Green would both return the group to the no-funding position where
they started. At that point, as Condorcet recognized long ago, the cycling would
begin again.
The real world is no doubt more complicated than this example. The
positions adopted by Laycock, Green, and Minow are not the only possible
positions. Separationists who oppose charitable choice and greatly fear the
regulation of religious entities may order the choices B-A-C.7 6 Those who support
charitable choice generally but will not fund religious entities if they are not
It is not entirely clear, however, that Minow would rank her second and third-place alternatives
in this way. This article assumes that she would prefer the deregulated-funding position over the no-
funding position. As Professor Saperstein notes, Professor Minow does not explicitly say which is her
least-preferred alternative:
Professor Minow believes that religious entities receiving government funds should not be
allowed an exemption from the civil rights laws applicable to other entities. It is not clear,
however, what Professor Minow would recommend if she lost the political battle on this
issue and the religious exemption were applied to federally funded programs. Would she
still argue that religious groups should receive government funding under such
circumstances?
Supra n. 16, at 1389 (footnote omitted).
76. Professor and Rabbi David Saperstein appears to take this position in his piece. See supra n. 16.
There, Professor Saperstein explains his opposition to charitable choice chiefly in terms of his grave
concern about religious institutions being regulated. Id. at 1365-66 (arguing that "these [regulatory]
exemptions that Professor Minow and others are now calling on religious institutions to give up in
exchange for government contracts and funding.., inherently threaten religious autonomy" and "may
be irreconcilable with the concept of First Amendment rights"). "Threats to Religious Autonomy" is,
in fact, the first category of reasons his paper gives to oppose charitable choice. Id. at 1365. If forced
to accept the funding of religious institutions, his paper thus suggests that he would prefer the
deregulated-funding position.
2004]
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regulated could rank them C-B-A.77 And lastly, proponents of charitable choice
that would prefer religious groups to receive funding, even if it means giving up
regulatory exemptions, could structure them A-C-B. 8 Nevertheless, the fact that
voters may order the choices in other ways does not alleviate the Voter's Paradox.
It only aggravates the problem.79
The problem, of course, is the failure of democratic decisionmaking. It is not
just that there is no solution that pleases a majority of voters; in our case, Laycock,
Green, and Minow would fail even to reach any sort of agreement. For each of
the three alternatives, there exists another alternative that two voters would
prefer. In the language of Arrow's Theorem, it may be that no perfectly
democratic solution can be reached with regard to charitable choice. Whether
Laycock, Green, and Minow were to represent judges on an appellate panel (or
justices on the Supreme Court), groups of legislators, blocks of interest groups, or
executive officials, they would not be able to reach a democratic consensus 0 This
is an unsettling conclusion. It is made all the more unsettling because the example
is not, as are the examples usually used to illustrate the Theorem, wholly
conjectural.
C. The Consequences of the Voter's Paradox and Some Concluding Reflections
on Locke v. Davey
The Voter's Paradox phrases its ultimate conclusions. in terms of cycling.
The real world, however, is not so simple-neither legislatures nor courts are
likely to eternally cycle through their options. It is at this point that Arrow's
Theorem comes into play, for the Theorem essentially states the costs invariably
associated with the prevention of cycling. For if drastic changes are made to the
way elections are conducted or to the way voters comport themselves, the risk of
cycling can be obviated.8
77. Professor Gilman may take this position. See supra n. 71.
78. This article cannot point to any commentator that has expressly adopted this position. This
should not be taken as an indication that no one adopts this position-commentators and interest
groups, unfortunately for purposes of this article, rarely rank their alternative preferences in a neat
fashion.
79. See Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at 952 (explaining how "[i]ncreasing the number of possible
alternatives or the number of voters only increases the possibility of cycling").
80. Arrow's Theorem applies to judicial bodies in the same manner as it would apply to legislative
or executive ones. For "[l]ike all other multimember decisionmaking bodies, courts are also
theoretically subject to the problems of cycling and inconsistency that Arrow's Theorem emphasizes."
Pildes & Anderson, supra n. 52, at 2140. See also Easterbrook, supra n. 66, at 823-31 (explaining, in
detail, why Arrow's Theorem is a particularly likely danger for the Supreme Court).
81. As Arrow would explain it, cycling is a breach of the first condition of rationality. To prevent
cycling, another of the five conditions-unanimity, nondictatorship, range, or the independence of
irrelevant alternatives-must be suspended.
Of these four conditions, it is difficult to imagine suspending either the unanimity or
nondictatorship conditions. As commentators explain, these two principles are so ingrained in
democratic theory that it seems virtually impossible to imagine democratic decisionmaking without
them. See Block, supra n. 51, at 992 ("Of Arrow's axioms, two are difficult to challenge: unanimity and
nondictatorship."). We will therefore consider how the problem could be addressed through a
relaxation of the other two conditions-the range and the independence of irrelevant alternatives
conditions., As is explained below, suspension of the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition
[Vol. 40:321
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss2/7
2004] ARROW'S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM
Arrow's Theorem suggests two possible resolutions. First, it may be that one
side in this three-way debate just breaks down. Being risk averse, one side of the
debate may be so hostile to its least-preferred choice that it may abandon its ideal
preferences to ensure against it. This is known as "strategic voting.",82 In our
example, a strong fear of the regulated-funding position may counsel Laycock into
accepting the no-funding position. Similarly, a deep aversion of the deregulated-
funding position may caution Green into accepting the regulated-funding position.
More likely than these two, however, is the third possibility: that Minow will
depart from the regulated-funding position to join one of the other two.83 In the
current charitable-choice debate, there has been strong pressure on advocates of
the regulated-funding position to move to one of the two other positions.' 4 Were
they to bend under this pressure, this "strategic action" would prevent cycling.
The second alternative is what is known as "agenda setting." If someone
were given the power to take one of the three positions off the table, the Voter's
Paradox would instantly dissolve. For a group of voters can always reach a
resolution between two choices, no matter how nuanced their preferences. To
apply this principle more concretely, note that if our illustrious panel was given
only two choices to choose from, it would easily resolve what to do. Pitted against
only the no-funding position, the deregulated-funding position would win. Pitted
can happen through "strategic voting," and suspension of the range condition can occur through
"agenda setting."
82. See Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at 953 ("'[Sltrategic' voting [occurs] when a voter refuses to vote
her first choice in order to increase the chances of getting her second choice."). In the language of
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem, this would be a failure of the independence of irrelevant alternatives
criterion, because voters should not be taking into account anything other than their own pure
preferences in making their voting decisions. Id. at 963 (explaining that "[tihis phenomenon violates
Arrow's Independence condition, because it means that a voter will take the preferences of others into
consideration in an effort to stop the cycle").
83. This seems the most likely possibility, because the regulated-funding position seems to be the
least supported position. See supra nn. 69-71 (listing the sponsors of each of the three positions).
84. For example, two of the pieces in the Harvard Law Review's symposium on public values were
almost explicitly directed at pushing Minow from her position over to the no-funding position. See
Saperstein, supra n. 16; Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New Religion and the Constitution, 116 Harv. L.
Rev. 1397 (2003). As noted before, Professor Saperstein's piece was heavily devoted to explaining why
regulation of religious institutions was morally and constitutionally problematic. See supra n. 76. Dean
Sullivan's piece was similarly directed:
Minow depicts in her article a world in which social services may be devolved from
government to private providers without too great a loss of public values. She includes
religious organizations among the private providers that may participate in joint public-
private ventures....
Under prevailing conceptions of freedom of speech, association, and religious practice,
however, such public conditions could not be imposed upon religious associations by
regulatory fiat. May government use contracts and vouchers to bribe religious entities into a
docility and public-mindedness it may not compel through fines and prohibitions? That is
the tension at the heart of this Commentary.
Sullivan, supra, at 1397.
85. Agenda setting, in the language of Kenneth Arrow, would be a breach of the range condition.
Hovenkamp explains the range condition as requiring that "[tihe social choice process must consider
all relevant individual preferences, and not just some arbitrarily defined subset. For examples, if
possible choices include outcome A, outcome B, and outcome C, the process may not arbitrarily drop
outcome C and force a decision between outcome A and outcome B." Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at 950.
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against only the deregulated-funding position, the regulated-funding position
would win. And pitted against only the regulated-funding position, the no-funding
position would win. Majority decisionmaking would yield a consistent outcome
and all would, apparently, be well.
The problem with this resolution, however, is that "stability is purchased at
the cost of arbitrariness. ''86 The ultimate decision that the panel would make
would be entirely dependent on the two choices given to the panel. How the
agenda is set would completely determine how the case is resolved. The path-
dependent nature of the decisionmaking process smacks of capriciousness. 7
This last point both illustrates an important point about the constitutional
issues in charitable choice generally and returns us to Davey. Commentators
debating charitable choice, as we have seen, make a variety of constitutional
arguments. Indeed, there are serious constitutional arguments against each of the
three positions. The no-funding position is argued to be an unconstitutional
discrimination against religion.88 The regulated-funding position is argued to be
an unconstitutional condition placed on religious exercise. 89 And the deregulated-
funding position is argued to be both an unconstitutional discrimination against
secular organizations and an authorization of unconstitutional acts of employment
discrimination.9° Each of these arguments should be seen as a subtle attempt at
agenda setting, for each of these constitutional arguments, if adopted by the
Court, would effectively take one of the three options off the table. 9'
Consider the advocates of the no-funding position. There has been
considerable emphasis by such advocates to push the issue of employment
discrimination. 92  They seek to make the deregulated-funding option either
politically infeasible or outright unconstitutional. Note that if they were to do
86. Pildes & Anderson, supra n. 52, at 2137.
87. As Pildes and Anderson put it, "[T]o achieve stability, therefore, the political outcomes [will]
depend so inherently upon the sequence of decisions, agendas, and institutions, that these outcomes
can be characterized as little more than arbitrary." Id. at 2137. See also Hovenkamp, supra n. 55, at
951 (noting that "the outcome of the vote will depend entirely on how the agenda is set").
88. See supra n. 44.
89. Seesupra n. 45.
90. See supra nn. 46, 48.
91. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Public Choice and the Future of Public-Choice-Influenced Legal
Scholarship, 50 Vand. L. Rev. 647, 654 (1997) (noting that because "the order of voting determines the
outcome.., significant power [is vested] in anyone who has the ability to manipulate the order of the
voting").
92. The emphasis on the employment discrimination issue among no-funding proponents is
pronounced. As Professor Green notes, "The discrimination issue has so resonated that the coalition
of church-state and civil liberties organizations that has fought Charitable Choice since 1995 renamed
itself the Coalition to End Religious Discrimination." Supra n. 31, at 8. See also Coalition Against
Religious Discrimination Letter, supra n. 70. Moreover, organizations adopting the no-funding position
rhetorically phrase their opposition to charitable choice in terms of opposing religious discrimination.
See Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Oppose the Faith Based Initiative: Tell Your
Elected Officials to Oppose Government Funded Religious Discrimination!, http://capwiz.comlau/issues
/alert/?alertid=519221&type=CO (accessed Jan. 6, 2005); Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs,
Faith-Based Plan Pits Church Autonomy Against Equal Employment Principle, http://www.bjcpa.org/
Pages/Views/2003/08.03hollman.html (accessed Jan. 6, 2005) ("Faith-based initiatives raise many
concerns, but the prospect of government-funded employment discrimination may be most troubling to
the general public.").
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such a thing-if the deregulated funding position were taken off the table-then
our Voter's Paradox would collapse into a simple pairwise decision between the
regulated-funding position and the no-funding position. Our panel would then
quickly decide on the no-funding position. In such a case, the proponents of the
no-funding position would have cleverly managed to capture the support of those
who are generally in favor of charitable choice, but who are gravely concerned
about the regulation of religious institutions.
Now consider Davey as a similar attempt at agenda setting. If the Court had
ruled in Davey's favor and held that religious institutions must be allowed to
participate in generally applicable funding programs, the unmistakable implication
would have been that the no-funding position, whether in a voucher context (like
Davey) or an indirect-funding context (like charitable choice), was
unconstitutional. Such a holding would have cut the Gordian knot our panel
faces; with the no-funding position eliminated, our panel would have quickly
resolved both the funding and regulation questions.
Ultimately, both Congress and the Courts need to be aware of these agenda-
setting points. Whatever the ultimate resolution of the constitutional issues
surrounding charitable choice (and there are many),93 the decision that chooses
between these three options must not be made in a piecemeal fashion. The
Supreme Court particularly must take this into account, given the usually
dichotomous nature of its decisionmaking process. It must recognize that its
determination on any of the constitutional issues surrounding funding or
regulation will have reverberations on the entire debate.
V. CONCLUSION
For over fifty years, our society has debated whether, and to what extent,
religious institutions should receive government funds for the provision of social
services. The debate has ranged from bus transportation to school vouchers, and
now to charitable choice. Initially, the debate was heated but simple. Its focus
was the question: should religious organizations receive government funds?
Now, however, the debate is not so simple. As religious groups have begun
to serve as equal providers of social services, the question of how they will be
regulated has taken on real importance. Suddenly, an uncomplicated debate over
the meaning of the Establishment Clause has exploded into a convoluted three-
way debate upon which principles of nonestablishment, free exercise, equal
protection, and unconstitutional conditions all bear.
The resulting debate can perhaps best be understood through the lens of
Condorcet's Voter's Paradox and Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Indeed, the
charitable-choice debate is a powerful and salient example of these rarely
encountered theorems so often utilized by social-choice theory. Not only is it
interesting to note their application to charitable choice, but they also illuminate
93. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra n. 32, at 983 ("[Ciharitable choice arrangements are thick with
constitutional questions .. "); see also supra nn. 44-48.
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the inherent risk of cycling in charitable choice and the agenda-setting and
strategic-voting attempts that may develop in the wake of that risk. Finally,
because charitable choice is such an ideal exemplification of Arrow's Theorem,
the charitable-choice debate may have use as a way of understanding how Arrow's
Theorem functions in our modern-day political system.
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